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Student Writing in Law: Fixed Discourse
Boundaries and Hospitable Crossings
Stephen Price
1 Introduction
In this article I discuss the ‘acquisition’ of and ‘engagement’ with
common law discourse attempted by two international postgraduate
law students in terms of a relationship of hospitality with language.
Like hospitality, language is marked for Derrida by a structure of
a ‘promise of a gift’ (Derrida 1998: 21, 66) which at the same time
can never be given but is ‘always yet to come’ (Derrida 1998: 67).
Nevertheless, as in hospitality, there is necessarily a sense that this gift
is real, there is ‘a language’ or specific discourse (such as the discourse
of common law in English) that one can ‘make oneself at home in’.
However, as Derrida shows, the logic implied in giving or receiving
a gift or hospitality at the same time leads to the subversion of its
possibility. Similarly there is a fundamental aporia in language in which
the acquisition of language or discourse at the same time depends on
its impossibility, though this does not foreclose the possibility of an
engagement or a struggle with it. It is the privileging of one side of
such a contradiction that Derrida argues cannot be justified and, in
the context of student writing, the ‘absolute’ distinction very often
insisted on between ‘paraphrase’ and ‘plagiarism’ fails to acknowledge
the process of engagement students undergo and the impossibility of
finally determining the dividing boundary such a ‘rule’ presupposes.
That is, a focus on the struggle with language, rather than on what
Law Text Culture Vol 17 2013 00
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makes language ‘mine’ or ‘not mine’, leads to a problematising of
this distinction. Central then to this discussion is the question of
boundaries, inclusion/exclusion, and the relationship between subject
and language.
2 The Students
Both students referred to in this study were international students
studying for a postgraduate Master of Laws in an Australian university
and were part of a small cohort of students who agreed to participate
in the PhD study this article is drawn from. Quotes by the students
cited in this article are from interviews held with them. Both students
had met the minimal English language proficiency entry requirement
(IELTS 6.5) and had completed a compulsory pre-entry five-week
English language bridging programme. These two students have
been selected as ‘telling cases’ in that their writing practices illustrate
theoretical points made in this article, but it is not claimed that they,
and the points made, are necessarily representative of student writing
more generally. The validity of more generalised claims would need to
be tested against a much broader sample.
Thuy, a female, Vietnamese student in her thirties, had completed an
undergraduate degree in law in her country; since graduating, she had
worked for a number of years as a legal adviser to parliamentarians in her
country. In this role, she was involved in drafting legislation. She had
also engaged in discussions with overseas legal advisers who had been
employed to guide Vietnam as it sought to introduce legislation that
would meet obligations placed on it by international treaties (treaties
that the government had either signed or wished to be a signatory to).
Despite her impressive experience, her exposure to common law had
been minimal, and she stated she had little understanding of it.
During the course of interviews she expressed a strong desire to
‘acquire English’ and to ‘understand western culture’ and she stated that
an important reason for pursuing postgraduate study in Australia was to
‘understand common law’, which she appeared to equate on occasions
with ‘western law’, presumably because of its association with United
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States law. She stated that after the opening of Vietnam to the outside
world, the study of English became popular and she too had decided
she wanted to understand the language and the ‘west’, although she
still lacked confidence about her use of English. Nevertheless, during
her time in Australia she had made great deliberate effort to improve
her vocabulary by paying attention to new words and phrases she heard,
often noting them and ‘trying out’ new ways of saying things. She had
a great interest in English language literature and during her stay in
Australia had bought many novels which she could not obtain at home.
She also expressed a strong interest in western popular culture. In her
interviews, comments about ‘the west’ were often conflated with the
role of the English language. Her study in Australia thus served the
interest of engaging at both professional and broader personal levels
with discourses and cultures she felt were still relatively unknown to
her, and this process of engaging with a discourse which is ‘other’ to
one is the concern of this article.

The second student, Narin, was a male from Thailand. He was
younger than Thuy (in his mid-twenties) and had also completed a
first degree in Law in his home country. However, unlike Thuy, his
only legal experience was that which was required to complete his
professional qualification.1 He had spent a number of months learning
English in another part of Australia prior to beginning his LLM
studies, but still did not feel very confident about his English language
proficiency. Despite this, he had very strong views on a number of social
issues regulated by the law which he could express quite forcefully.
His lecturer valued Narin’s opinions, commenting that he was ‘quite
unlike’ most Asians she taught because of his outspokenness and his
willingness to seek her out when he needed advice on the research
assignment he was doing for her course.
3 Language as hospitality

In his eulogy to Levinas, Derrida reiterates his agreement with him
that ‘the essence of language is friendship and hospitality’ (2001b: 207).
This is because language fundamentally entails ‘a relation to the other’
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which ensures that one is placed in a relation to language not of mastery
but of listening and being sensitive to that which one is not already in
possession of (2005d: 166). This relationship, however, is not simply
with the idea communicated through an utterance which, in Bakhtin
for example, always comes to us from prior uses and is ‘saturated’ with
the voices of others which will always remain present even as we inflect
and nuance such language with our own voice and make it ‘our own’
(Bakhtin 1986). For Derrida, this otherness is not constituted by the
presence of another’s meaning but by any such meaning being the
product of a sign system which at the same time renders such meaning
ultimately indeterminable. It is this contradiction which characterises
the otherness of language and our relationship to it. A message is
possible only when produced through a sign system, and therefore
through signs which are of necessity iterable. However, ‘by virtue of its
essential iterability, a written syntagma can always be detached from
the chain in which it is inserted without causing it to lose all possibility
of its functioning’ (Derrida 1988: 9). It can be iterated in contexts
which are ‘illimitable’ and which are ‘never absolutely determinable’
(1988: 3) and are ‘without any centre or absolute anchorage’ (Derrida
1988: 12). Consequently, the meaning of an utterance is never finally
determinable, even though at the same time it functions to communicate
meaning. This contradiction represents in language an excess which can
never be reduced to the meanings generated from language use, and
this non-dialectical aporia Derrida places at the heart of language. The
possibility of a unique communicative utterance relies on a code and
signifiers whose iterability ensures such a unique utterance can never
be finally secured. This contradiction cannot be resolved because it is
the condition of meaning making.
Elsewhere, Derrida suggests language is marked by a ‘wound’ which
lies beyond hermeneutic interpretation: ‘Such a gaping belongs neither
to the meaning, nor the phenomenon, nor to the truth, but, by making
these possible in their remaining, it marks in the poem [or text] the
hiatus of a wound whose lips will never close’ (Derrida 2005c: 152).
This wound, he adds, ‘appeals to the other without condition, in the
language of a hospitality that can no longer be subject to a decision’.
146
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Thus there is in language a ‘dissemination irreducible to polysemy’
(Derrida 1988: 20) or to ‘hermeneutics in Gadamer’s sense’ (Derrida
2005d: 165). As Derrida observes, ‘We can inventory a multiplicity of
meaning’ (2005d: 165) but there is ‘always an excess that is not of the
order of meaning’ (2005d: 165); it is this excess, a consequence of the
iterability which marks language, which ensures an ‘independence’ of
language which ‘continues to act’ even in the absence of a reader or
writer (Derrida 1988: 8).

This non-translatable excess is also found at the material level of
language. Derrida discusses the shibboleth as ‘the differential mark’
which in itself has no meaning yet ‘becomes what one must know ... to
see oneself granted the right of asylum or the legitimate habitation of a
language’ (Derrida 2005a: 26). The shibboleth has no meaning but ‘it is
the ciphered mark that one must be able to partake of with the other,
and this differential capability must be inscribed in oneself, that is, in
one’s own body as much as in the body of one’s own language’ (2005a:
26). There is of course nothing natural about the shibboleth, it is entirely
cultural in nature, yet itself it has no meaning, it is from ‘the outsideof-meaning ... the cipher of the cipher, the ciphered manifestation
of the cipher as such’ (2005a: 27). Thus in the shibboleth we find
‘insignificant difference as the condition of meaning’ (2005a: 28-9),
an indispensable mark which is untranslatable itself. A shibboleth,
such a mark distinguishing a text or language, is inseparable from
language, and in a similar way Derrida notes how the juxtaposition of
words against each other (and in particular the introduction of phrases
from a different language into a text) have an effect which cannot be
retained in translation. ‘Everything seems, in principle, translatable,
except for the mark of the difference’ (2005a: 29).
We will return again to the significance of this material, nontranslatable yet indispensable element of language use in the next
section when discussing the patchwriting practices of one of the
students discussed. An engagement with language entails an
engagement with the otherness of language, with that which cannot be
translated, paraphrased or assimilated into already existing schemata,
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and this engagement for Derrida involves a relationship of hospitality
between the self and other.

Thus, an impossibility marks both language and hospitality, or
rather, both are wholly possible because of an irreducible contradiction
or aporia which marks them. Derrida argues that ‘pure hospitality’,
like a ‘pure gift’, is offered without expectation of anything in return,
‘without horizon’ (Kearney and Dooley 1999: 70). The imperative
underlying the concept of hospitality is that in welcoming the other
to ‘make themselves at home’ the host offers to them all the rights and
privileges the host enjoys. As Derrida notes, this is risky: the newcomer
may wish to destroy your home. Nevertheless, ‘if you want to control
this and exclude in advance this possibility there is no hospitality’
(Kearney and Dooley 1999: 70) and in practice borders are set up.
‘Pure hospitality’ thus involves an opening of self, a vulnerability in
which one’s relationship to the other cannot be regulated by ‘law’ but
is supported only by trust. ‘Conditional hospitality’ is what we find
practiced, in which limitations are necessarily imposed (see Derrida
2001: 20-23).

The setting up of boundaries or limitations is not, however,
merely a self-interested act but a necessary act, since ‘pure hospitality’
would involve the host surrendering proprietorial rights over that to
which the other is welcomed and in so doing surrendering the power
necessary to act as host. Thus, occupying the position of host, which is
necessary for hospitality to be extended, at the same time subverts the
possibility of ‘pure hospitality’ in the name of which a host necessarily
acts. True or ‘pure’ hospitality renders hospitality itself impossible
and so hospitality necessarily fails to live up to itself. Consequently,
particular instantiations of hospitality subvert the ‘universal’ concept
which supports them and makes them possible. Imperfect, particular
instantiations of hospitality are therefore not corrupt or shadowy forms
of the ‘real’ thing, as a neoplatonic understanding might argue, but
rather they are irreconcilable with this ‘universal’ while at the same
time inseparable from it. It is this relationship between the particular
and universal values of a concept, rather than a sharing between them
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of some common ‘essence’, which is the condition of their possibility.
For Derrida the privileging of one term in such a binary is therefore
unjustified, yet it is such a privileging, on a more general scale, that he
argues has plagued western metaphysics.
Still (2004: 115) suggests that ‘the laws of hospitality which govern
the culturally sanctioned role of host as master of the house would fit
with our sense of the author as master of his work’. On the one hand,
we invite the texts of others into our own text, ‘suitable guests who will
behave appropriately ... who are like me, speak my language’ (2004:
115) or will in effect do my bidding. On the other hand, however,
‘pure hospitality’ (Derrida in Kearney and Dooley 1999: 70) or ‘wild
hospitality’, as Still puts it, opens the risk of being taken over by this
language of others, of being open to ‘invasions by barbarians I do not
know whose languages I do not speak’ (Still 2004: 115) and being
taken over and treated badly (Derrida in Kearney and Dooley 1999: 70).

The tension that Still refers to, between attempting to ‘master’ the
language to make it work according to my own intentions, and the
risk of it taking over, is not strictly a choice or a struggle between two
separate impulses. Rather, the sense of mastery is only possible because
language will resist any such mastery – the iterability that enables a
language to exist for us and make ‘mastery’ over meanings possible is
precisely that which, at the same time, makes such mastery impossible.
As with hospitality, inviting a word to make itself ‘at home’ (as guest)
runs precisely the risk that it will do so and deprive us of our position as
host/master. Thus while mastery is integral to hospitality and language
use, it simultaneously undermines the possibility of hospitality and
of the effectiveness of language. As Derrida observes, ‘There is ... in
every utterance ... an inaccessible secret’ (Derrida 2005d: 164) and to
not remain open to that ‘excess that is not of the order of meaning’
(2005d: 165) and to fix the meaning of a text would be to destroy
the text (2005d: 166). In his own reading Derrida says ‘I try to make
myself listen for something that I cannot hear or understand, attentive
to marking the limits of my reading in my reading’ (2005d: 166) and
consequently, he argues ‘one should speak while leaving to the other
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the chance to speak, while giving floor to the other’ (Derrida 2005d:
167). This is possible only if one has not already finalised the other’s
speech by imposing on the text a final word, and if one remains open
to the otherness of the excess in language.

Thus in language, as in hospitality, there is a threshold which is never
arrived at, never actually crossed. We can argue that this circumstance
describes well the position of a student who perhaps eagerly anticipates
a discourse, but does not know what the discourse is and thus awaits it
to reveal itself. But the border which divides the host from the guest
and in so doing makes possible the constitution of both as such is
itself a border that is spectral in quality, both present and not present
simultaneously. To be host, one must of necessity be master of the
space into which one invites a guest, but this of equal necessity limits
the possibility of hospitality, since if the host is to remain master the
guest can never take up hospitality in its proper sense of assuming the
gifted unconditional right of presence. Thus, hospitality ‘forbids in some
way even what it seems to allow to cross the threshold’ (Derrida 2000:
14); ‘It remains forever on the threshold’, indeed, hospitality ‘becomes
the threshold’. Hospitality is this aporia, its possibility predicated on
its impossibility. In this respect we can never know it as such because
‘once we know it, we no longer know it’ (Derrida 2000: 14): it can
never be seized as such, its presence is marked also by its absence. Thus
‘hospitality can only take place beyond hospitality’ and consequently
it ‘is always to come, but a ‘to come’ that does not and never will
present itself as such’ (Derrida 2000: 14). While the motivation for
engagement with language is to achieve mastery and control over the
meanings we communicate, language retains a secret which ensures
mastery is never complete.
The language and discourses students engage with have a similar
property. Of necessity, students experience the language they work
with and the disciplinary discourses they must engage as ‘givens’ which
they need to understand and acquire in order to utilise them effectively.
Yet that which distinguishes a discourse or genre from other ones of
necessity needs to be reproducible, and this iterability at the same time
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ensures that the boundaries and discreteness of each can never be finally
settled (Derrida 1988: 10). Thus, our relationship to language is marked
by a struggle, a bodily struggle even, but not mastery or appropriation
(Derrida 2005b: 101).

I will now consider what this means for the two students discussed
in this article. While we might see language as saturated with borders
of various sorts (plagiarism / paraphrase; correct / incorrect grammar;
generic forms; and so on), these borders exist in anticipation or
retrospection, but are never actually encountered as such or crossed,
and certainly never finally settled. Thus we might argue the moment
of discourse acquisition never actually occurs: one can construe a
discourse as an object one anticipates mastering at some stage, or one
can identify oneself as already in possession of it, but these identity
positions have illusory elements and the moment of identifying a
discourse or acquiring it never actually arrives. One is always subject
to the undecidability of language and consequently ‘identity is never
given, received or attained; only the interminable and indefinitely
phantasmatic process of identification endures’ (Derrida, 1998: 28).
This applies equally to identities a person assumes as well as to those
we attribute to and by which we distinguish discourses, genres and so
on. Thus we are ‘neither inside nor outside’ language but instead find
ourselves ‘on the shores’ of a language, ‘on the unplaceable line of its
coast’ (Derrida 1998: 2).
4 Student engagement with legal texts
Both students expressed some despair at the lack of background
knowledge they had about the discipline and the content dealt with
by the texts they engaged with. Both stated they did not know how
their texts would be read, how marks were allocated; however, both
responded in significantly different ways to their shared predicament.
I would characterise Narin as engaging predominantly with the
‘instrumental’ value of his sources, whereas Thuy was more concerned
with their ‘intrinsic’ value, even though unavoidably they retained
instrumental value (that is, they were made use of in order to fulfil the
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assignment demands placed on her).

Narin sought to subject the texts he engaged with to existing
interests and ideas he held. Thus he expressed great enthusiasm for
texts he found which supported the position he had chosen to develop
in his assignments, or because they provided a counter-argument he
could use without seriously undermining his position. Nevertheless,
while expressing great commitment to the position he defended in his
assignments, he felt little conviction about his arguments. One reason
for this was that he believed he had to rely on source texts and this not
only hindered and frustrated his ability to express his point of view,
but it also made his own text quite empty. That is, he felt all he could
do was repeat what others said, but he could not say what he wanted
to say. This suggests a relative lack of engagement with source authors;
they were instead a ‘mine’ of information which he could instrumentally
use when developing his own point of view, but doing so was in effect
a process which frustrated expression of that point of view. That is,
the authors he introduces into his texts as guests remain subjected to
his mastery and are not permitted to speak. They are guests ‘who will
behave appropriately ... who are like me’ (Still 2004: 115), allowed
entry because they share Narin’s views and fit in with his plans. Thus,
for Narin this welcome is both conditional and partial. They serve
pre-given interests and he accommodates them in his text because the
institution demands this of him. Unfortunately, he finds that having to
acknowledge and incorporate them hinders the free expression of his
ideas and their presence consequently diminishes the value he places
on his finished text.
One way of characterising Narin’s approach is to say that he does not
engage with the otherness of the discourses he is dealing with. Thuy, in
considerable contrast, does. Her stated desire is to acquire a sense of the
discourses she engages with, and to find a voice in them, even though
(like Narin) she feels she lacks the background knowledge necessary
to make clear, solid and confident meanings from them. I would argue
that her engagement with the ‘otherness’ of these discourses is achieved
to a considerable extent through her ‘patchwriting’. For Howard (1995),
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patchwriting refers to the process of creating a text or significant
segments of a text largely from borrowed language chunks, whether at
phrase or sentence level, creating in effect a patchwork composed from
others’ writing. Thuy drew on such a practice, only at times representing
the sourced wording as a quotation which she acknowledged. We can
characterise her patchwriting as a form of ‘wild hospitality’ (Still 2004)
or ‘pure hospitality’ (Derrida in Kearney and Dooley, 1999: 70). That
is, Thuy invites into her text authors and their words which take over
and ‘make themselves at home’, and in an important sense author her
text. Thuy thus both authors her text and is authored; she engages with
the words of others which criss-cross her text and in doing so both
orchestrates meaning and surrenders to meanings that for her remain
thin, ‘whose names I do not know’ (Still 2004:115).

In this respect, the boundaries that Narin keeps so much in place
between ‘host’ and ‘guest’ are now in Thuy’s case destabilised, or can
even be said to be reversed, in that Thuy now becomes the guest of the
discourse which ‘hosts’ the place she wishes to be welcomed into. Thus
we see in Thuy’s circumstance the emergence of the ambiguity of the
host-guest relationship Derrida speaks of, where the host yearns for
the guest, even an unknown guest, who makes possible his existence
as a host and therefore liberates the host (Derrida 2000:10). Thuy is
thus constituted as writing subject in a relationship where, in Still’s
ambiguous phrase which alludes to the desire underpinning any
engagement with language, one relishes being ‘ravished by another’s
tongue’ (Still 2004:115).

But this relationship is not an easy one for Thuy. She speaks of
profound anxiety as she struggles with her assignments, and I would
suggest this reflects the dissolution of boundaries that she has hitherto
worked within and which normally provide a secure sense of self and
identity. But at the same time her texts provide her with a degree of
satisfaction which is not explicable in terms of the institutional and
instrumental purpose her texts serve: as Thuy claims, ‘I don’t care what
mark I get’. Significantly, neither is it commitment to the position
developed which provides this satisfaction: she admits ‘I don’t feel
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strongly about the position I argue’. Instead her satisfaction is with
the text itself. There is an engagement with language not reducible to
meanings but which nevertheless provides considerable satisfaction
and I suggest this can be viewed in light of the ambiguous hostguest relationship she has with her source texts as representatives
of the discourse she seeks to acquire and be welcomed into, and the
constitution of herself as writing subject through that relationship; a
subject exposed to the ‘inalienable alienation’ that is constitutive of the
subject in language (Derrida 1998: 25).

Despite the heavy patchwriting her text incorporated, Thuy spoke
of the words as being hers, a statement I believe reflected a genuine
experience. Her process wasn’t one of appropriating the ideas and
words of others to fulfil already given interests, which, as we have
seen in Narin’s case, results in frustration when they cannot be easily
subdued and made to do his bidding. In contrast, the boundaries upon
which the possibility of frustration depends are dissolved and instead
it is anxiety which predominates as Thuy finds herself, as writing
subject, surrendering to a discourse which she believes to exist yet
which remains unknown to her. In this way she is closer than Narin
to a sense or experience of the ‘promise’ which ‘precedes all language’
(Derrida 1998:66).
Thuy approaches in a state of expectation that there is a language,
a gift of language (1998: 67) which she wishes to receive, even though
she does not know what that gift is apart from the name she gives it
(common law discourse). She enters into a relationship of trust with
language rather than control, and thus exposes herself to that which is
other, precisely in the sense that it is unknown to her yet presupposed
as having a presence. As Derrida remarks, that which is ‘other’ ‘is
infinitely other’ and ‘we never have any access to the other as such’
(1999: 71, original italics). Thus it remains unknown, yet a determinate
object to be possessed. Thuy is in this relationship to common law
discourse. While there is therefore a sense of a boundary to cross (a
point of entry into the discourse) this boundary nevertheless remains
undetermined for her.
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This discourse-object therefore is a peculiar one: it is precisely
because it is unknown and non-defined that it can exist as an imagined
‘determinate’ object for Thuy, organising her desire and facilitating her
engagement. This discourse she engages with is therefore characterised
by being simultaneously both present and absent, a kind of spectre,
where an idea is non-identical with itself, marked by a ‘trace’, a term
Derrida uses to describe ‘the part played by the radically other within
the structure of difference that is the sign’ (Spivak 1976: xvii). There
is the assumption of a discourse which through engagement can
be possessed or mastered, but where engagement instead leads to
‘transformation, change and displacement’ (Derrida 2005b: 104).
Writing is always a rewriting. Thus ‘language, the word – in a way the
life of the word – is in essence spectral ... it repeats itself, as itself, and
is every time other’ (Derrida 2005b: 104). Unlike Narin, it is with this
spectral quality that Thuy works.

The act of producing a text does, of course, require judgments
be made. Thuy does sometimes make judgments of an instrumental
nature, according to prior knowledge or interests, and sometimes
using relatively arbitrary criterion. She says she sometimes follows
a ‘conservative’ line because she feels it is ‘safer’, more established,
and other times holds onto an idea or line of thought because she is
‘fascinated’ by it. However, she also states that on numerous occasions
she reached a point where making a decision about what to say, which
direction to pursue, was ‘very difficult’ and all she could do was ‘just
try’. The plaintiveness with which she said this added to the sense that at
such points she found herself without bearings, without a rule to follow,
but nevertheless had to continue. Such moments suggest exposure to
the aporia we have noted characterise hospitality and language.
For Derrida hospitality only begins when we press against the
impossibility of hospitality (2000:14) or ‘experience (which means travel
or go through) this paralysis’ (Caputo 1997: 111), where hospitality
‘remains forever on the threshold of itself ’ (Derrida 2000: 14). In
language, this aporia exists at the moment where language itself cannot
be in possession of determinate meaning, not because of multiple
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possible contexts which open up multiple interpretations, but because
that which makes meaning possible [iteration, citationality] at the same
time ensures that it cannot be possible (Derrida 1988). There is a ‘nonidentity of itself to any language’ (Derrida 2005b: 101) and a moment
in making judgments where following a rule fails us.2

The dissemination of meaning in language therefore ensures there
is always an excess ‘irreducible to hermeneutics’ (Derrida 2005d:
165) or to the potentially multiple but singular meanings we produce
and for Derrida this excess calls us ‘to listen for something I cannot
hear or understand’ in the text (2005d: 166). Thuy’s desire to acquire
the common law discourse places her in precisely this position of
listening for what as yet she cannot hear, of refusing the boundaries
that are constructed by existing understandings and interests which
Narin, I have suggested, remains attached to. This pressing against
the impossibility inherent in language brings us closer to the ‘abiding
alienation’ of the subject within language; not an alienation of an
already given subject but an alienation which is the subject, which
brings it into being (Derrida 1998: 25). Thus we find ‘a terror inside
languages’ which ‘is our subject’ (1998: 23). In the case of Thuy, the
ontological state – of uncertainty and of terror –Derrida speaks of can
be linked, I would suggest, to the anxiety and depression she spoke of
which accompanied her at times while struggling with her assignments.
The difference I have tried to outline between Narin and Thuy is
manifested, as might be expected, in the texts they produce. Principally,
Narin’s text was composed of paraphrase and what is commonly referred
to as his ‘own’ wording, except where he provided cited quotes. In
contrast, in addition to cited quotations, Thuy’s text, as already noted,
was heavily patchwritten. However, Thuy’s text was not, in my view,
an instrumental manipulation of source texts, a means of ‘cobbling
together’ a text in order to get through her course. She stated that in
fact she had been quite worried about plagiarism while writing; her
main fear was that she might formulate ideas of her own which others,
unknown to her, had already expressed. Furthermore, when asked
about the language in her text, she insisted quite strongly that the
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language, the words, were ‘hers’. In my view this was not an attempt
to deceive, 3 but rather an expression of the subjective relationship she
had with the language.

For Narin, the intertextual activity he engages in reduces the sense
he has of his own ‘presence’ in his text; having to use sources diminishes
his capacity to express his point of view. For Thuy, in contrast, the
intertextual activity enhances her sense of presence, but not at the level
of meanings, which for her lack sufficient richness, but at the level of
text. I now want to link this sense of participation, of ‘self ’, of ‘owning’
the words that find their way into her text, to the excess in language that
follows from the iterable and citational nature of language and which
gives rise to a ‘dissemination which exceeds polysemy’ (Derrida 1988:
21), that is, to a dissemination not explicable in terms of the multiple
meanings a text may be given.
For Derrida, every sign ‘can be cited, put between quotation marks’
but this also means ‘it can break with every given context, engendering
an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimitable’
(1988: 12). He points out, however, that ‘this does not imply that the
mark is valid outside of a context, but on the contrary that there are only
contexts without any centre or absolute anchorage’. This possibility is
not accidental to the mark but its absolute condition, ‘without which a
mark could not even have a function which is called ‘normal’ (1988: 12).

As already noted, both students stated they lacked sufficient
disciplinary context or understanding of the background from which
their source texts emerged. Narin dealt with this problem largely by
invoking contexts and interests he was already familiar with. This led
to some frustration with understanding his sources as well as using
them, but by and large they presented him with ideas he felt he could
work with. In this process he willingly rewrites his sources to align
them with the interests he has and causes them to speak in his voice.
He uses ‘citation or reference as ornamentation; choice jewels or flowers
which decorate or embellish the master’s house’ (Still 20004:115). In
contrast, Thuy resists such a move in her bid to be open to this other
discourse, but because she has no firm sense of a context in which
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to situate her understanding, having refused to privilege both prior
interests and understandings she brings and the institutional one she
finds herself in, the possibility of paraphrase is less available to her.
Instead she does not give way on her desire to privilege the disciplinary
discourses and their contexts.

Therefore, I suggest that for Thuy the source texts themselves, as
text, provide a substitute context. They are in fact not a means to an
end, but the embodiment of the end Thuy seeks, that is, the disciplinary
discourse. They do not merely provide symbolic representations of a
discourse which lurks ‘behind’ them in some way, but are icons of the
discourse and as such the texts she engages with are the discourse. Her
desire to engage with a discourse which in its presumed uniqueness is in
excess of that which can be rewritten, the non-translatable idiom of the
discourse as it were, that which distinguishes it, binds her to the texts.
In this respect to re-write or paraphrase can risk losing the discourse
she is seeking to acquire, rather than provide a means by which she
accesses it. Paraphrase places at risk that which she experiences as
distinguishing the discourse in the texts she engages with, even though
she is certainly capable of paraphrase, as demonstrated in an interview
when asked to orally outline some of the ideas she had worked with.
For Derrida, that which distinguishes a text in its uniqueness and is
most proper to it is its idiom, and this ‘what is most proper in language
cannot be appropriated’ (2005: 101) since to paraphrase is to speak that
which is unique in ‘a language whose generality takes on a value that
is in some way structured, universal, transcendental’ and hence no
longer unique (Derrida 1998: 20). This non-translatable idiom of the
text is not found by Thuy in the sense of meaning but is given by the
material text itself. The text embodies this discursive uniqueness and it
is retained in a re-iteration of the text. Context itself is not brought to
the text to make sense of it, but is given by the materiality of the text.
This is not a matter of the student lacking the ability to paraphrase,
or believing that the original says things in a better way than the student
can. While the student may believe this is so, I am suggesting that there
is an element in the original which cannot be said in a different way
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and it is this which Thuy identifies with the discourse she is engaging
with. As her assessor commented, Thuy has sufficient ability in English
to organise her patchwritten text into a ‘seamless’ text; thus, the
patchwritten text provides her bedrock, against which she does indeed
provide quotations and citations to foreground authorship or wording
usually to good rhetorical effect. Indeed, her lecturer stated that if this
text is plagiarised, ‘it is such a magnificent piece of plagiarism (she laughs
quite forcefully) that it either can’t be, or, you know, [she] almost deserves
credit for it [she has] strung it together seamlessly well’. Although the
lecturer carried out basic checks for plagiarism, she decided ‘why would
[Thuy] spend so much effort doing such a supreme piece of plagiarism.
That’s just too much work. It’s easier to write yourself ’.

Thus, although Thuy was able to establish meaning in such a
way that her reader read her text as, largely, a seamless unity, for
Thuy the position developed was not, as already noted, the source
of her satisfaction. Instead, her satisfaction lay in her text, and I am
suggesting this is tied to an operation of language which exceeds and
is not reducible to meanings realised through the text, that is, it is
tied to the excess Derrida argues belongs to citationality. As Thuy
seeks to cross the border from familiar discourses to another, it is the
citationality integral to language which she identifies with and thus
the material words she encounters provide the medium for crossing,
like the shibboleth (Derrida 2005a), and it is in this moment of excess
irreducible to meaning that the words she takes up are experienced
as her own. We can perhaps juxtapose her practice against Derrida’s
statement that ‘to translate is to lose the body’ of the text (2005d: 168),
this body which is ‘the uniqueness incorporated, incarnated, in what
one used to call the ‘signifiers’, in the graphemes which in themselves
cannot be translated’ (2005d: 168). It is this attempt to engage with the
unique object-discourse, via her source texts, which I am suggesting
exposes Thuy to the ‘excess’ by which she is carried forward and so
engages with the ‘otherness’ of the discourse she seeks to acquire.
There is much more which needs to be said about how identification
with the materiality of a text occurs, but this cannot be pursued here.
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However, the idea that subjects are constituted through identification
and positioning by discourses is a widely held view. For example,
critical discourse analysis (see Fairclough 1992) attempts precisely to
show how identities are formed and positioned by discourses and their
meanings. A difficulty with such approaches in general is that there is
little explanation of how a subject takes up the positions a discourse is
said to provide, of what aligns the participants with a given reading,
with specific symbolic meanings, especially when the discourse is
new to the reader. I am suggesting that the materiality of texts also
needs to be taken into account, and it is possible to argue that Thuy
engages with the texts as icons of the discourses she seeks to acquire.
It is through this relationship at the iconic level of meaning that Thuy
is constituted as a subject and which in consequence causes her to
subjectively experience the language as hers, that is, as that in which
she herself has come to being as an imaginary subject of the discourse
represented by the texts. Through the materiality of the signifiers this
sense of ‘self ’ is provided and it is for this reason the language she uses
is experienced as her own.
5 Conclusion
In this article I have argued that language and discourse are
engaged with through a relationship similar to that of the host-guest
in hospitality. Such a relationship presupposes definitive categories
and identities which at the same time are at risk of subversion by the
process of engagement. For Derrida, neither moment – of maintaining
such categories, or of their dissolution – is to be privileged since both
are mutually dependent upon the other. For this reason there is a ‘nonidentity to itself of any language’ (Derrida 2005b: 101) and indeed,
of subjective identity. Yet working with determinate categories and
concepts is unavoidable, and as such clear boundaries are usually
maintained and indeed insisted upon.
For students, the process of learning can be often viewed as one of
‘crossing’ boundaries, navigating between a wide range of definitive
classifications, one of which has to do with the distinction between
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‘paraphrase’ and ‘plagiarism’ which is generally quite rigidly policed. In
this article I have argued that engagement with unfamiliar discourses by
students can follow a path where existing rules, categories or identities,
both institutionally and self-imposed, are maintained, or one can
engage in the kind of ‘bodily struggle’ which exposes the uncertainty
of the boundaries such categories rely on and leads the student into
unknown territory where boundaries distinguishing discourses and
self are struggled with.

I have argued that in Thuy’s case, reaching a point of producing a
text which is ‘hers’ involves the creation of a self in relation to her sources
which from the perspective of a rigid rule about plagiarism might
seem illegitimate. Yet for both Thuy and her lecturer-assessor, while
‘plagiarism’ remains a signifier marking something strictly prohibited,
its signified is far less determinable. The boundaries dividing what is and
is not permissible become uncertain and are reinvented. Engagement
with discourse effects a change in such boundaries and consequently
in the subject engaging with it, and I have suggested that in Thuy’s
case such changes are not reducible to engagement with the symbolic
function of language alone but they are also intimately bound to her
engagement with the materiality of text.
Notes
1
2
3

Narin summarised his legal experience as follows: ‘I completed a Bachelor
degree and then took another year to finish uh [pause] Thai barrister’.

See Derrida 1990 (also in Kearney and Dooley 1999: 66) where a decision
entails a ‘responsibility heterogeneous to knowledge’.
See Pecorari 2003 for similar comments.
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